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Abstract 
 
There is little research on how accounting information quality affects a firm’s external 
financing choices. In this paper, we use the occurrence of accounting restatements as a proxy for 
the reduced credibility of accounting information and investigate how restatements affect a 
firm’s external financing choices. We find that for firms that obtain external financing after 
restatements, they rely more on debt financing, especially private debt financing, and less on 
equity financing. The increase in debt financing is more pronounced for firms with more severe 
information problems and less pronounced for firms with prompt CEO/CFO turnover and auditor 
dismissal. Our evidence indicates that accounting information quality affects capital providers’ 
resource allocation and that debt holders help alleviate information problems after accounting 
restatements.   
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1. Introduction 
A fundamental objective of financial reporting is to facilitate resource allocation in the 
capital markets. In their conceptual framework, both the FASB and IASB emphasize that 
accounting information should be useful to a wide range of capital providers, including creditors 
and equity investors, to decide whether to provide financing. Because different capital providers 
can have different abilities to address information problems, an immediate question is whether 
accounting information quality affects firms’ choices among external capital providers. In this 
paper, we examine how accounting restatements, a proxy for reduced credibility of accounting 
information, affect firms’ choices among private debt, public debt, and equity.1  Accounting 
restatements offer an ideal setting to study the impact of accounting information quality on 
financing choices because prior research finds that restatements lead to a decrease in accounting 
credibility (e.g., Wilson 2008). We therefore link the decrease in accounting credibility to 
changes in firms’ external financing choices. Examining this link can help us better understand 
how accounting information quality affects capital allocation overall as well as specific firms’ 
financing decisions. Such an investigation is especially important given the recent empirical 
evidence that challenges the importance of information asymmetry in explaining firms’ financing 
decisions (Fama and French 2005).2   
This paper is also motivated by the prevalence of accounting restatements observed in the 
last decade.  The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) documented that from January 
1997 to June 2002, 919 firms restated their financial statements because of accounting errors 
                                                 
1 We focus on an important dimension of accounting information quality: the credibility of accounting information. 
We argue that in the restatement setting, credibility is the dimension of accounting quality that undergoes the most 
significant change from before to after the restatement. To simplify the discussion, we use accounting information 
quality and credibility interchangeably hereafter.   
2 Examining the frequency and magnitude of firms’ external financing, Fama and French (2005) conclude that 
information asymmetry in general does not seem to be an important determinant of external financing choices. 
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and/or frauds (GAO 2003). Spurred by the growing list of accounting and corporate scandals, the 
U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes and Oxley Act (SOX) on July 30, 2002. However, Hennes et 
al. (2008) and Scholz (2008) find that the number of restatements continues to be high in the 
post-SOX period. While prior studies have examined the consequences of restatements in terms 
of the drop in market value and the reduction in accounting quality, it is less clear how 
restatements affect firms’ financing and operations. Our paper extends this line of research by 
shedding light on the impact of restatements on firms’ external financing choices. An altered or 
limited set of external financing choices can be another consequence of aggressive financial 
reporting, with direct impact on firms’ external financing flexibility as well as investments and 
operations.  
The premise of our hypotheses is the link between accounting credibility, information 
asymmetry, and external financing choices. Prior research shows that financing choices are 
affected by the information asymmetry between outside investors and insiders (e.g., Myers and 
Majluf 1984). Because debt holders (particularly private debt holders) can obtain information 
through private channels, information asymmetry problems affect debt financing less than equity 
financing. After restatements, the credibility of financial reporting is lower; outsiders are more 
suspicious of the information provided by managers. Although investors have more accurate 
information about the restated period, restatements lead investors to question the quality of the 
firm’s financial reporting. As a result, information credibility is lower, and the perceived 
information asymmetry is likely greater after restatements. Thus we expect restatement firms to 
rely more on debt financing, in particular private debt financing, and less on equity financing. 
However, if information asymmetry is not an important determinant of financing choices, as 
argued by Fama and French (2005), or if the cost of additional debt financing (e.g., an increase in 
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default risk and close monitoring by lenders) is excessively high, then we will not find results 
consistent with these predictions.   
We test our predictions using a group of 819 firms announcing accounting restatements in 
the period 1997-2006, including 236 material restatements as identified by Hennes et al. (2008) 
and 583 other restatements.3 We use the full sample of restatements to broaden the research 
scope and at the same time separate out material restatements to increase the power of tests. We 
obtain data on private debt, including bank loans, from DealScan and data on public debt and 
equity from Securities Data Corporation (SDC). We find that the likelihood of obtaining external 
financing is significantly lower after restatements, primarily for firms with material restatements, 
consistent with these firms having difficulty obtaining external financing.  
More importantly, for restatement firms that obtain external financing after restatements, 
we find that they rely more on debt financing and less on equity financing than they do before, 
consistent with our prediction. We also find that the results are driven by firms with material 
restatements; other restatement firms do not experience significant changes in the composition of 
external financing after restatement announcements. Among firms with material restatements, 
the proportion of external financing in the form of debt increases by about 11 percentage points. 
Further analysis indicates that this increase is driven by private debt financing. The relative use 
of public debt does not change significantly. These results are consistent with material 
restatements leading to more serious doubts among investors regarding the quality of financial 
reporting.  
                                                 
3 Hennes et al. (2008) classify a restatement as an accounting irregularity if restatement announcements or SEC 
filings include words like “irregularity” or “fraud,” if the firm is charged by the SEC or the Department of Justice, or 
if the firm is subject to independent investigations. See Hennes et al. (2008, 1493-1494) for details and Andrew 
Leone’s website for the list of “accounting irregularities” (http://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu/).  In this paper, we refer to 
these “accounting irregularities” as material restatements because these restatements are likely material but not all of 
them are proved to be intentional or fraudulent in nature.   
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We next explore whether the extent of information problems affects the change in external 
financing choices. We find that, consistent with our prediction, among firms with material 
restatements, those with a greater increase in forecast dispersion after restatement 
announcements experience a larger increase in debt financing than others. This result is robust to 
controlling for changes in investors’ expectations about firms’ future earnings.  
Analyses of individual years in the post-restatement period show that for the first three 
years after restatement announcements, firms uniformly rely more on debt financing. At the 
same time, the increase in debt financing is gradually tapering off. We also find that firms with 
more negative restatements are more likely to switch to debt financing. We further find that 
restatement firms that promptly replace their CEOs / CFOs and external auditors experience a 
smaller change in external financing choices. This indicates that promptly replacing top 
executives and auditors can help the firm to regain investors’ confidence. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing direct empirical evidence on the impact 
of accounting information credibility on external financing choices among private debt, public 
debt, and equity. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the implications of 
accounting information quality for firms’ choices among a broad menu of financing means. On 
one hand, our finding that restatement firms rely more on debt financing indicates the importance 
of debt holders in alleviating information problems. On the other hand, our finding suggests that 
equity capital providers are affected more by accounting information quality.  
A recent study, Bharath et al. (2008), investigates how accrual quality affects firms’ choice 
between private and public debt. They find that firms with lower accrual quality prefer private 
debt over public debt financing.  We advance the literature by examining the impact of 
accounting information credibility on a full range of external financing choices in the restatement 
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setting. We find that in the restatement setting, a setting where a firm experiences a significant 
drop in accounting information credibility, the main tradeoff is between private debt and equity 
financing, while the tradeoff between private and public debt financing is less critical. It is equity 
financing, not public debt financing, that restatement firms shy away from.  
Our paper is also related to recent studies that document increases in the cost of capital 
after restatements: Hribar and Jenkins (2004), Graham et al. (2008), Shi and Zhang (2008). 
While an increase in the cost of capital implies that firms are less likely to raise external 
financing, it does not inform us whether firms alter external financing choices after restatements. 
Our paper complements these studies by investigating whether restatement firms’ choices across 
different financing sources are affected. We provide evidence that restatement firms increase 
their reliance on private debt (including bank loans), which comes with higher costs and more 
stringent contract terms after restatements, as documented in Graham et al. (2008). In addition, 
we find that after restatements, the increase in the use of debt financing is associated with a 
decrease in return volatility. If this decrease in return volatility is the outcome of foregoing risky, 
but positive net present value projects, then the increased reliance on debt holders after 
restatements can be detrimental to shareholders. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of prior 
research and develops hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the restatement sample and data. Section 
4 reports the main analysis of external financing choices, and Section 5 reports additional and 
sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Prior research and hypothesis development 
Our paper builds on two lines of research: (1) studies that investigate the economic 
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consequences of accounting restatements, and (2) studies that examine how accounting 
information quality affects external financing choices. Below we briefly review these studies and 
then develop our hypotheses of the impact of restatements on external financing choices.  
2.1 Economic consequences of accounting restatements 
An accounting restatement is a correction of previously issued financial information that is 
inaccurate. In many cases, the restatement is a result of governance weaknesses (e.g., Agrawal 
and Chadha 2005) and the breakdown of the management reward system (e.g., Burns and Kedia 
2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Efendi et al. 2007). In the most severe cases, accounting 
restatements can lead to the discovery of egregious accounting frauds such as in the cases of 
Enron and WorldCom. As such, restatement announcements often lead to a significant drop in 
market value and a confidence crisis among outside investors. Consistent with this notion, the 
credibility of reported earnings decreases and the perceived information asymmetry increases 
significantly following restatements (Anderson and Yohn 2002; Palmrose et al. 2004; Wilson 
2008).  
Three recent studies examine the change in the cost of capital after restatements. Hribar 
and Jenkins (2004) find that the implied cost of equity capital increases after restatement 
announcements.4 Focusing on private debt, Graham et al. (2008) find that the cost of bank loans 
increases by about 0.7 percentage points after restatements. Graham et al. also find that 
compared to loan contracts completed before restatements, those initiated after restatements have 
shorter maturity, are more likely to have collateral, and have more covenants. Shi and Zhang 
(2008) find a similar increase in interest rates for bonds issued after restatements.  
While these findings indicate that restatement firms are subject to higher cost of capital, it 
                                                 
4 Table 2 of Hribar and Jenkins (2004) indicates that depending on the model specifications, the median of the 
increase in the implied cost of equity capital ranges from 0.17 to 0.42 percentage points and the mean of the increase 
ranges from 0.9 to 1.75 percentage points.  
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is unclear from these findings whether restatements affect firms’ external financing choices. 
First, the increase in the cost of capital appears to be of similar magnitude across different types 
of external financing. Second, the costs of private and public debt financing are only available 
for those firms that obtain such debt financing after restatements. Thus, we do not know what the 
cost would have been if other firms had also obtained debt financing; it could be higher or lower 
than what is estimated for firms with debt financing. This incomparability of samples across 
these studies suggests that the results cannot be directly compared. Third, financing choices 
depend not only on price terms (e.g., interest rate) but also on non-price terms, such as the 
maturity and the use of collateral for debt financing. Thus, examining price terms alone does not 
provide enough information for firms’ external financing choices (e.g., Graham et al. 2008).  
In summary, prior research documents that accounting restatements lead to substantial 
damage to financial reporting credibility, increases in the perceived information asymmetry, 
decreases in shareholder wealth, and increases in the cost of capital. Our paper extends this line 
of research by investigating how restatements affect firms’ external financing choices. Findings 
of changed or restricted external financing choices after restatements will be evidence of another 
economic consequence of accounting restatements and evidence that accounting quality affects 
external financing choices.  
2.2 Accounting information quality and external financing choices 
With the exception of Bharath et al. (2008), to date there is limited research that examines 
how accounting information quality affects external financing choices.5 Focusing on the debt 
market, Bharath et al. examine how accounting information quality, as measured by accrual 
                                                 
5 Several studies (e.g., Ball et al. 2008; Hope et al. 2010) examine issues related to financial reporting and external 
financing in an international setting. For example, Ball et al. (2008) examine the role of external financing providers 
in shaping financial reporting and find that debt holders have a greater impact on conservatism than equity holders.  
Hope et al. (2010) focus on private firms and find that it is easier for private firms with more credible accounting 
information (proxied by the existence of an external audit of the financial statements) to obtain external financing.  
8 
 
quality, affects firms’ choices between private and public debt financing. They find that firms 
with lower accounting information quality, except those with high growth opportunities, are 
more likely to use private debt than other firms. Unlike Bharath et al., we examine not only the 
tradeoff between public and private debt financing, but also the tradeoff between debt and equity 
financing, a central focus of many capital structure studies. Lower information credibility, as 
manifested by restatements, likely affects both the debt-equity and the private-public debt 
tradeoff. Taken together, these two papers provide a more complete picture of how accounting 
information quality affects external financing choices.6 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
Our main hypothesis focuses on whether restatements affect firms’ external financing 
choices among the following: private debt (including bank loans), public debt, and equity.7 Here 
we discuss the key determinants of external financing choices and how those determinants 
change after restatements.  
Debt versus equity 
When there is information asymmetry between managers and outsiders, potential equity 
investors require higher returns to compensate for the information risk. Banks and other lenders, 
on the other hand, have better information about the firm, as they can devote more time and 
resources to information acquisition activities and have better access to the management. 
                                                 
6 Our paper is also related to studies that test the basic claim of the pecking order theory that information asymmetry 
affects capital structure decisions. The extant findings are mixed. For example, while Fama and French (2005) 
conclude that information asymmetry is not a significant determinant of financing choices, Bharath, Pasquariello, 
and Wu (2009) find that information asymmetry, as measured by the adverse selection component of the quote and 
bid-ask spread, affects capital structure decisions. Our paper differs from these studies by focusing on accounting 
information credibility, specifically, the event of reduced accounting information credibility as a result of accounting 
restatements.                                              
7 We do not expect restatements to affect bank loans and other privately placed debt (e.g., debt placed with wealthy 
individuals or institutions other than banks) differently. These two types of financing are similar in terms of lenders’ 
information advantage, lenders’ close monitoring, and the ease of negotiation in the event of default. Thus, we 
combine these two and refer to them as private debt throughout the paper.  
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Accordingly, information asymmetry between lenders and managers is lower than that between 
equity investors and managers (e.g., Diamond 1991). In addition, debt holders can protect their 
investments by imposing stricter contracting terms (e.g., collateral) that are unavailable to equity 
investors. Thus, in the presence of information asymmetry, firms prefer debt financing over 
equity financing (Grossman and Hart 1982; Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984).  
After restatements, investors are more suspicious of the information provided by managers, 
and the credibility of financial reporting is lower.8 As a result, investors will discount the 
information provided by the firm, leading to an increase in perceived information asymmetry.9 It 
thus follows that the greater perceived information asymmetry will lead to an increase in the 
relative use of debt financing. 
The above discussion leads to our first hypothesis:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, restatement firms are more likely to use debt financing and are less 
likely to use equity financing in the post-restatement period. 
   
One might argue that firms prefer equity financing after restatements because the benefits 
of debt financing–the reduction in income taxes and the mitigation of free cash flow problems–
are less important after restatements due to firms’ poorer performance (Jensen 1986). Also, the 
increased likelihood of bankruptcy, the close monitoring of debt holders, and the increased 
restrictions of debt financing after restatements might deter managers from debt financing (Datta 
et al. 1999; Fama and French 2002). Therefore, whether firms rely more on debt financing after 
                                                 
8 Prior studies find that accounting information credibility decreases and perceived information asymmetry increases 
after restatements, using proxies including earnings response coefficient, bid-ask spread, forecast dispersion, and a 
market-based measure of accounting information quality (Anderson and Yohn 2002; Palmrose et al. 2004; Ecker et 
al. 2006; Wilson 2008). In additional tests reported later, we confirm that restatement firms in our sample experience 
a significant increase in information asymmetry.  
9 In its conceptual framework, the FASB emphasizes the importance of information credibility for investors’ 
decisions. In paragraph BC2.43, the FASB (2008) argues that (emphasis added), “Clearly, information will not be of 
much help in decision making if users do not consider it worthy of belief. … Whether users consider the information 
in an entity’s financial report to be credible will depend heavily on their view of the trustworthiness of the entity’s 
management and auditors.” 
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restatements remains an empirical question. 
Private versus public debt 
Among debt holders, private lenders usually have information advantage over public debt 
holders. While public debt holders have to rely on public disclosure, companies can provide 
information to private debt holders selectively when managers are concerned with the cost of 
disclosing potentially proprietary information in public. Private lenders also enjoy economies of 
scale in information acquisition and monitoring activities due to their concentrated holdings. The 
free-rider problem with information acquisition is less a concern in the private debt setting, and 
thus private lenders are more willing to acquire information about the companies, further 
reducing information asymmetry. Because of these reasons, private lenders (including banks) 
have an information advantage (Boyd and Prescott 1986; Diamond 1991; Datta et al. 1999). 
Consistent with this notion, Bharath et al. (2008) find that firms with high abnormal accruals, a 
proxy for information risk, prefer bank loans to public debt. 
In addition, in the event of debt covenant violation, renegotiation costs are lower for private 
debt than for public debt because it is easier to negotiate with a small set of lenders than with a 
large group of bondholders. After restatements, the prospect for the firms is poorer and the 
default risk is generally higher (Graham et al. 2008). To reduce ex post negotiation costs, 
restatement firms are more likely to obtain financing from a relatively small group of lenders 
than from a large group of bondholders.  
The above discussion leads to our second hypothesis:  
H2: Ceteris paribus, restatement firms are more likely to use private debt financing, 
relative to public debt financing, in the post-restatement period. 
 
The impact of information problems after restatements  
When making external financing decisions, firms trade off information benefits and 
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contracting costs of debt financing (Hart and Moore 1995). Our discussions above focus on the 
average change for restatement firms. In addition, the underlying argument implies that firms 
with more severe information problems after restatements are more likely to rely on debt 
financing than other firms. That is, the more severe the information problem is, the larger the 
increase in debt financing after restatements. Hence we predict that:  
H3: Ceteris paribus, restatement firms that have more severe information problems are 
more likely to use debt financing in the post-restatement period than other restatement 
firms. 
 
Following prior research (e.g., Graham et al. 2008), we use the change in analyst forecast 
dispersion around restatements to proxy for information problems after restatements. The greater 
the increase in forecast dispersion, the more serious the information credibility issue will be after 
restatements. Since restatements are associated with both a decrease in information credibility 
and a decrease in performance, we control for change in analysts’ expectations of future 
performance.   
 
3. Sample and data 
3.1 The restatement sample and matching firms 
GAO (2003) and later updates contain restatements announced from January 1997 to the 
first half of 2006. Recent studies show that the restatements included in GAO reports vary in 
severity and nature. While some restatements are material and probably result from intentional 
misstatements, others result from accounting errors and difficulties in implementing complex 
accounting rules (e.g., Srinivasan 2005; Hennes et al. 2008; Plumlee and Yohn 2010). In order to 
achieve a balance between a comprehensive set of restatements and the power of the tests, we 
use all restatements with available data as the full sample but separately investigate the subset of 
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restatements that are classified as “accounting irregularities” by Hennes et al. (2008), which we 
refer to as material restatements. We expect material restatements to lead to greater loss of 
investors’ trust in managerial integrity and greater reduction in accounting credibility than other 
restatements. Thus, the tendency for restatement firms to switch to debt financing, as 
hypothesized in H1 and H2, is stronger for firms with material restatements than for other 
restatement firms. 
Table 1, Panel A presents the sample selection. We start with 2,705 restatements in the 
GAO reports. We lose 341 restatements because of missing basic financial data from Compustat 
and an additional 573 due to multiple restatements announced by the same firm in the sample 
period.10 Following prior research of external financing, we exclude 321 firms in utilities (SICs 
4900-4999) and financial industries (SICs 6000-6999). Since our main objective is to examine 
the change in external financing choices after restatements, firms without any external financing 
activities around restatements will not contribute to our investigation. As a result, we exclude 
284 firms that have no external financing activities in the six years around the restatement 
announcement year – the fiscal year in which the restatement was announced. We then exclude 
189 restatement firms that do not have required data to calculate regression variables. 
To ensure that our results are not driven by the temporal shift in the external financing 
markets, we compare the restatement firms with a group of firms matched on industry 
membership, year, firm size, and performance measures.11 We are unable to find matching firms 
                                                 
10 Because we need both pre- and post-restatement information, we only keep the first observation for firms with 
multiple restatements to avoid any contamination effects of earlier restatements on later ones. Based on our reading 
of firms’ filings related to restatements, many of the subsequent restatements are related to the same restated period 
as the earlier restatement. Our results are robust to excluding firms with multiple restatements.   
11 Specifically, for each restatement firm, we find a matching firm from Compustat that does not have restatements 
in the sample period. We match in the year of the restatement announcement based on the following criteria: (1) the 
same 3-digit SIC code, (2) total assets within 10 percent of the restatement firm’s total assets, and (3) the closest 
rank of firm performance (defined as the average rank of market-to-book ratio, Z-score, and stock returns over the 
year; if any of the three measures is missing, we use the other two measures to calculate the average performance 
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for 26 restatement firms and thus exclude them from the sample. We lose another 152 
restatement firms because the corresponding matching firms do not have required data to 
calculate regression variables. The above steps leave us with a full sample of 819 pairs of 
restatement and matching firms. Of these restatements, 236 are classified as material 
restatements, i.e., those identified as “accounting irregularities” by Hennes et al. (2008), and the 
rest (583) as other restatements. The yearly and industry distribution (untabulated) indicate that 
there are slightly more restatements in the second half of the sample period and that the sample 
firms operate in a broad spectrum of industries. 
Table 1, Panel B presents descriptive statistics on restatement firms’ financial 
characteristics in the year of restatement announcement. On average, restatement firms have a 
market value of $2.2 billion and are profitable, with a mean ROA of 5.7%. The mean market-to-
book ratio and debt-to-total-assets ratios are 1.771 and 0.253, respectively. Firms with material 
restatements are slightly larger than the average restatement firms and have worse accounting 
performance (ROA) and more negative stock returns in the year of restatement announcements.  
3.2 The timeline 
To investigate the change in external financing choices after restatements, we compare the 
three fiscal years before restatement announcements (years t-3, t-2, and t-1) and the three fiscal 
years afterwards (years t+1, t+2, and t+3). See Figure 1 for the timeline. The impact of 
restatements is gauged by the change in external financing choices from the pre- to the post-
restatement period. For the post-restatement period, we study the period as a whole in the main 
                                                                                                                                                             
rank). As with restatement firms, we require that matching firms have external financing activities in the six years 
around the corresponding restatement announcement year. For the restatement firms for which we are unable to find 
a matching firm using the above criteria, we maintain the matching criteria of size and performance rank, but relax 
the restrictions on industry membership, using two-digit SIC codes or one-digit SIC codes.  Because of imperfect 
matches, we follow Cram et al.’s (2009) suggestion and control for these variables explicitly in the regressions. We 
include firm size, market-to-book ratio, stock returns, and industry dummies in the main analyses. We include Z-
score in a sensitivity test due to data availability issue and obtain quantitatively similar results.  
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analyses in order to increase the power of tests and study individual years separately in an 
additional test to shed light on the over-time change in external financing choices. Because 
financing in the restatement announcement year includes both financing before restatement 
announcements and financing after restatement announcements, we do not include it in the tests 
of our hypotheses. In a sensitivity test, we include year t in the post-restatement period and the 
inferences remain the same.  
Figure 1 Time Line 
3.3 External financing data 
We collect data on restatement and matching firms’ debt and equity financing for the six 
years around restatement announcements. We obtain data on private debt, including bank loans, 
from DealScan. We obtain data on public debt and equity from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC). For each type of financing, we collect information on individual transactions and then 
aggregate transactions with completion dates or issuance dates in the same fiscal year together to 
come up with the total amount of financing for a firm-year. We add the amount of all three types 
of financing together to obtain the total external financing for a firm-year.  
Table 2 reports the number of restatement firms that obtain external financing in the 
restatement announcement year and in each of the six years around it. It also reports the average 
amount of external funds raised for firms with external financing. The number of firms with 
external financing ranges from 294 in year t+3 to 446 in year t-1. The average amount of external 
Restatement 
announcement 
Post-restatement period Pre-restatement period 
Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t+1 Year t+2 Year t+3 
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financing raised ranges from $456 million in year t+1 to $720 million in year t+3. With respect 
to the types of external financing, the magnitude of debt financing is greater than that of equity 
financing. Within debt financing, the magnitude is greater for private debt than for public debt. 
These patterns also hold for the matching firms and the material restatement firms. For brevity, 
we do not tabulate the statistics on external financing for them.  
We examine the change in the likelihood of external financing for restatement firms. The 
results are reported in Appendix B. Specifically, we regress the incidence of external financing 
on the indicator for the post-restatement period, the indicators for material restatement and other 
restatement firms, the interaction of the post-restatement period indicator and the restatement 
indicators, and control variables. We find that compared with matching firms, firms with 
material restatements are less likely to have external financing after restatements than before. We 
find no change in the likelihood of external financing for other restatement firms. This result is 
consistent with the difficulty of obtaining external funds for firms with material restatements, 
confirming prior research that the cost of raising capital increases after restatements.  
 
4. Change in external financing choices after restatements  
4.1 Univariate analyses 
In this section, we report the univariate analyses. To test the impact of restatements on 
external financing choices, we adopt a difference-in-differences approach. We first compare the 
pre- and post-restatement levels of the use of a particular type of external financing. This 
comparison controls for the effects of time-invariant firm attributes. We then compare the change 
in external financing between restatement firms and matching firms. This comparison controls 
for the impact of the change in macroeconomic condition on external financing choices. Because 
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we identify matching firms based on industry, year, size and performance measures, this 
comparison also controls for the influence of these factors.  
Table 3 reports the results, first for all restatement firms then for material restatement 
firms. The proportion of each type of financing for a firm in the pre- (post-) restatement period is 
defined as the ratio of this type of financing in dollar amount to the total amount of external 
financing for the firm in t-1~t-3 (t+1~t+3); if a firm does not have this type of external financing, 
the ratio is set as zero. This variable is only meaningful for periods with external financing; thus, 
the analyses are based on observations with non-zero external financing in the pre- or post-
restatement periods.  
Overall, for the full sample of restatement firms, the proportion of equity financing drops 
from 30.2 percent in the pre-restatement period to 27.5 percent in the post-restatement period. 
However, during the same period, matching firms also experience a similar decrease in the 
reliance on equity financing. The difference in the change in equity financing between the two 
groups is insignificant (p=0.985). The difference in the change in private or public debt financing 
is not significant either.  
The results are different once we focus on firms with material restatements. While the 
matching firms experience an insignificant decrease in the use of equity financing, firms with 
material restatements experience a significant decrease in their reliance on equity financing 
(from 32.4 percent to 19.1 percent). The difference in differences is significant at the 0.014 level. 
The pattern is opposite for the use of private debt. For firms with material restatements, the 
proportion of private debt financing increases significantly from 51.0 percent to 66.5 percent, 
while the change is insignificant for the matching firms. The difference in differences is 
significant at the 0.004 level. With respect to public debt financing, the changes are insignificant 
17 
 
for both material restatement firms and matching firms.12  
These univariate analyses indicate that while the full sample of restatement firms do not 
experience a significant change in external financing choices compared to matching firms, firms 
with material restatements experience a significant increase in the use of private debt financing, a 
significant decrease in the use of equity financing, and an insignificant change in the use of 
public debt. These findings are consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2 for firms with material 
restatements. The lack of significant results for the full sample is consistent with the notion that 
non-material restatements likely have little impact on the credibility of financial information and 
financing structure.  
4.2 Multiple regressions 
Research design  
To investigate the change in external financing choices after restatements, we regress the 
relative use of each type of external financing on an indicator for restatement firms, an indicator 
for the post-restatement period, and the interaction of the two: 
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External_Financingj,it is the relative use of type j financing (j = total debt, private debt, public 
debt, or equity) by firm i in year t. It is defined as the ratio of type j financing in dollar amount to 
the total amount of external financing in the year, and it is set as zero for firm-years without type 
j external financing. Restatementi is an indicator for restatement firms and 0 for matching firms. 
Postit is the indicator for the post-restatement period (year t+1, t+2, and t+3). Because some firm-
years do not have a specific type of external financing and thus have a value of zero for the 
                                                 
12 In an untabulated analysis, we also compare the leverage between the pre- and post-restatement period and find 
that relative to matching firms, firms with material restatements experience a significant increase in leverage, 
consistent with the increased reliance on debt financing. 
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dependent variable, we use Tobit regressions. Following Cram et al. (2009), we include dummies 
for each pair of restatement and matching firms. We also control for industry-fixed effects. We 
adjust standard errors for firm and year clustering.  
In this regression, coefficient E1 captures the difference between restatement and matching 
firms in the pre-restatement period, coefficient E2 captures the change in external financing 
choices for matching firms from the pre- to the post-restatement period, and coefficient E3 
captures the incremental change for restatement firms. A positive (negative) coefficient E3 
indicates that the relative use of type j external financing is higher (lower) after restatement 
announcements for restatement firms than for matching firms. 
Following prior research (e.g., Hadlock and James 2002; Rauh and Sufi 2008), we include 
the following control variables: firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, return on assets 
(ROA), tangible assets (PPE/TA), marginal tax rate, and stock returns. Public financing has a 
higher fixed cost than private financing; thus economies of scale imply that it is cheaper for large 
firms to obtain public financing than for small firms. Firms with higher leverage are less likely to 
rely on debt financing due to the increased default risk. Prior research also suggests that firms 
tend to rely less on debt financing when the market-to-book ratio and past stock returns are high 
and when performance is poor (Fama and French 2002; Rauh and Sufi 2008). The use of 
collateral can reduce the cost of debt financing; thus firms with more tangible assets are more 
likely to rely on debt financing. One important benefit of debt financing is the tax benefit of 
interest expense; thus firms with higher marginal tax rate are more likely to use debt financing. 
All control variables are measured at the beginning of the year of interest or in the year before.  
Since we examine the proportion of one particular type of external financing over total 
external financing, the multiple regressions are estimated using firm-years with non-zero external 
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financing. However, whether to obtain external financing is not a random decision. To control 
for this potential selection bias, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-step approach. In the first step, 
we run a logit regression of the incidence of obtaining external financing using all firm-years 
(with or without external financing), with the same explanatory variables as in regression (1). We 
then add the Inverse Mills Ratio generated from the first step to regression (1).  
Test of H1: The relative use of total debt financing (versus equity financing) 
Table 4 reports regression results for the relative use of total debt financing. As reported in 
Column (1) of Table 4, consistent with H1, restatement firms rely more on debt financing after 
restatement announcements than matching firms. Compared to the pre-restatement period, the 
relative use of debt financing increases by 3.7 percentage points for restatement firms in the post-
restatement period, significantly different from zero at the 0.021 level.  
The coefficients on the control variables, except leverage, marginal tax rate, and stock 
returns, are significant at conventional levels. We find that large firms, more profitable firms, 
and firms with more tangible assets are more likely to rely on debt financing. Firms with higher 
growth opportunities (higher market-to-book ratio) are less likely to rely on debt financing. We 
find that the coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio is significantly different from zero, indicating 
the importance of controlling for the potential selection bias. 
As discussed earlier, the tendency to switch to debt financing is stronger for firms with 
material restatements due to more serious credibility issues associated with material 
restatements. To investigate this possibility, we replace the restatement indicator in regression 
(1) with two indicators, one for material restatements (Material) and the other for other 
restatements (OtherRestatement): 
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In this regression, coefficient E31 captures the incremental change for firms with material 
restatements, and coefficient E32 captures the incremental change for other restatement firms. 
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the regression results. Compared to the matching firms, 
firms with material restatements experience a significant increase in the relative use of debt 
financing. The estimate of E31 is 0.111, significant at the 0.001 level, indicating that the relative 
use of debt financing increases by 11.1 percentage points. In contrast, we find that other 
restatement firms do not experience a significant change in debt financing. 
In summary, the results reported above are consistent with hypothesis H1–firms rely more 
on debt financing and less on equity financing after restatement announcements. The increase is 
driven by firms with material restatements, and other restatement firms do not experience a 
significant change in debt financing.  
Test of H2: The relative use of private versus public debt financing 
In this section, we test H2 by examining the relative use of private debt financing in total 
debt financing. For this purpose, we use the same model specifications as in equations (1) and 
(2), except that (i) the dependent variable is the relative use of private debt financing over total 
debt financing, measured as the proportion of private debt financing in dollar amount over total 
debt financing, and (ii) the regressions are estimated based on firm-years with non-zero debt 
financing.13   
Table 5 reports the regression results, first for all restatements in Column (1) and then 
                                                 
13 Since the sample used in this regression only includes firm-years with non-zero debt financing, we control for the 
potential selection bias of having non-zero debt financing by using Heckman’s two-stage approach. The first-stage 
regression estimates the probability of having debt financing and the second stage controls for the Inverse Mills 
Ratio.  
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separately for material restatements and other restatements in Column (2). Compared to 
matching firms, restatement firms on average experience a significant increase in the relative use 
of private debt financing and this increase is driven by firms with material restatements. As 
reported in Column (2), firms with material restatements experience a significant increase in the 
relative use of private debt financing: the increase is 8.6 percentage points and the p-value is 
0.022. Other restatement firms do not experience a significant change in the relative use of 
private debt compared to the matching firms.  
With respect to control variables, we find that large firms, high growth firms, and firms 
with more tangible assets are less likely to use private debt financing because it is cheaper for 
these firms to borrow from the bond market (e.g., Diamond 1991; Bolton and Freixas 2000; 
Hadlock and James 2002; Denis and Mihov 2003; Antoniou et al. 2008). More profitable firms 
and firms with higher marginal tax rate are more likely to rely on private debt financing.  
Overall the results in Table 5 are consistent with H2 that after restatement announcements 
firms rely more on private debt financing than on public debt financing. This result is consistent 
with private debt holders being more effective in alleviating restatement firms’ information 
problems. Again, the results only apply to firms with material restatements, not to other 
restatement firms. 
4.3 Cross-sectional variation in the change of external financing choices – information effect 
In this section, we present tests of H3 and investigate whether restatement firms with more 
severe information problems rely more on debt financing than other restatement firms.  
Following Graham et al. (2008), we use the change in analyst forecast dispersion to proxy for the 
extent of information problems; the larger the increase in forecast dispersion, the more severe the 
information problem is. The change in forecast dispersion is measured as the difference in 
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forecast dispersion between the three months before and the three months after restatement 
announcements, and forecast dispersion is calculated as the standard deviation of one-year-ahead 
earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast.14 To facilitate 
result interpretation, we define Dispersion_up as the decile rank of the change in forecast 
dispersion and standardize it to the range [0,1]; the more dispersed earnings forecasts become, 
the higher the value of Dispersion_up.  
Restatement announcements are generally associated with both an increase in forecast 
dispersion and a decrease in analyst forecast. To ensure that our results are not driven by the cash 
flow effect, we also control for change in analysts’ expectation of future performance. Following 
Hribar and Jenkins (2004), we use the change in analyst earnings forecast to proxy for the cash 
flow effect. The change in analyst forecast is calculated as the difference in one-year-ahead 
earnings forecast (of the same fiscal year) issued in the three months before and the three months 
after restatement announcements, scaled by the fiscal-year-end stock price preceding the 
restatement announcement.15 We define Forecast_down as the inverse decile rank of the change 
in forecasts and standardize it to the range [0,1]; the more negative forecast revision is, the 
higher the value of Forecast_down.  
Since we find that only firms with material restatements experience a significant change in 
external financing choices, we focus on firms with material restatements in this analysis (as well 
as in analyses presented in later sections). We use the following regression to examine the 
incremental effect of information problems:  
                                                 
14 Note that we require that the forecast dispersions for pre- and post-restatement-announcement are measured using 
analyst forecasts issued for the same fiscal year to ensure consistency.  
15 Hribar and Jenkins (2004) document that the majority of the revision in analyst forecasts around restatement 
announcements show up in one-year-ahead forecasts. 
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Under this specification, E51 (E52) captures the incremental impact of the information (cash 
flow) effect on the change in debt financing experienced by firms with material restatements.  H3 
implies that E51 is positive. Ex ante, it is unclear how the cash flow effect influences external 
financing choices. As documented in prior studies and confirmed in our analysis, while a 
decrease in the market-to-book ratio can lead to an increase in debt financing, a decrease in 
profitability can actually lead to a decrease in debt financing. Therefore we have no prediction 
for the sign of E52. 
Table 6 reports regression results. As reported in the table, E51 is significantly positive at 
the 0.003 level. That is, consistent with H3, material restatement firms with a larger increase in 
forecast dispersion rely more on debt financing than other material restatement firms. E52 is 
significantly negative, suggesting that material restatement firms with a larger downward 
forecast revision rely less on debt financing than other material restatement firms.   
Overall, the results in this section suggest that (1) the information effect contributes 
significantly to the shift toward debt financing among firms with material restatements, and (2) 
the results are robust to controlling for the cash flow effect. These results lend further support to 
our argument that the reduced accounting credibility and the increased information asymmetry 
after restatement announcements lead to greater reliance on debt financing. 
 
5. Additional and sensitivity analyses  
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5.1 The change in external financing choices for individual years after restatements  
In the main analyses, we examine the average change in financing choices in the post-
restatement period. To investigate whether the change in external financing choices applies to all 
three years in the post-restatement period, we replace the post-restatement period dummy in 
regression (1) with three indicators for the first, second, third year after the restatement ( 1itI , 
2
itI , 
and 3itI ).  For the sake of completeness, we also include an indicator for the year of restatement 
announcement ( 0itI ). 
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Coefficient E20 (E21, E22, E23) captures the change in the relative use of debt financing for 
the matching firms from the three years before restatement announcements to the year of 
restatement announcement (the first, second, third year afterwards), and coefficient E30 (E31, E32, 
E33) captures the incremental change in debt financing for firms with material restatements.  
The regression results are presented in Table 7. The table shows that the increase in the 
proportion of debt financing applies to the year of restatement announcement and to the three 
years afterwards. With the inclusion of control variables, the incremental increase in debt 
financing for firms with material restatements is 17.5, 19.1, 13.6, and 10.6 percentage points in 
year t, t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively. Therefore, it appears that (1) the effect of material 
restatements on external financing choices start to show up in the year of restatement 
announcement and (2) for the first three years after restatements, firms uniformly rely more on 
debt financing, although the increase in debt financing is gradually tapering off. 
5.2 The effect of CEO/CFO turnover and auditor dismissal 
Many restatement firms try to take measures to rebuild investors’ trust, including replacing 
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CEOs and CFOs and dismissing auditors (e.g., Desai et al. 2006; Hennes et al. 2008; Hennes et 
al. 2010). If such measures are effective, we should expect that material restatement firms with 
CEO/CFO turnover or auditor dismissal experience a smaller change in external financing 
choices, or more specifically, a smaller increase in debt financing.  
We test this prediction in an additional analysis and report the results in Table 8. To 
investigate whether material restatement firms with CEO/CFO turnover differ from other 
material restatement firms in the change in external financing choices, we first create an 
indicator variable, CEO/CFO_Turnover and then add an interaction term, Post × Material 
×CEO/CFO_Turnover, to the regression model. If both the CEO and CFO in year t+1 are 
different from those in year t-1, we set CEO/CFO_Turnover to be one. Because firms with more 
negative restatements are more likely to replace CEO/CFO (Desai et al. 2006), we control for the 
effect of restatement magnitude. Similarly, we use a dummy variable, Auditor_Dismissal, to 
indicate material restatement firms with auditor dismissal by year t+1 and add the corresponding 
interaction terms to the regression.16  
As reported Table 8, we find that material restatement firms with CEO/CFO turnover have 
a smaller increase in debt financing than other material restatement firms. In addition, material 
restatement firms with auditor dismissals have a smaller increase in debt financing than other 
material restatement firms. We also find that firms with more negative restatements have a 
bigger increase in debt financing, consistent with more negative restatements leading to more 
severe information problems after restatement announcements. 
Overall, this analysis indicates that a prompt replacement of top executives and auditors 
has a significant impact on external financing choices. Replacing the top executives and auditors 
                                                 
16 Of our sample of material restatement firms, around 28% replace both CEO and CFO by year t+1 and around 17% 
dismiss auditors by year t+1. Using alternative definitions does not affect the results qualitatively. 
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promptly indicates the firm’s determination to rebuild investors’ trust, and thus helps address the 
information problems after restatement announcements.  
5.3 Costs of private debt financing 
So far we have documented an increase in the use of debt financing for firms with material 
restatements.  However, the increase in the use of debt financing is not without costs. Graham et 
al. (2008) document an increase in loan spread, a decrease in loan maturity, and an increase in 
the use of covenants. We collect data on loan spread and maturity and find similar results; the 
loan spreads increase by 66.7 basis points from 192.9 to 259.6 basis points with a p-value of 
0.001, and the loan maturities decrease by 3.6 months from 48.5 to 44.9 months with a p-value of 
0.001.  
Another potential cost of the increase in debt financing to shareholders is debt holders’ 
restriction on firms’ investments and operations. Shareholders and debt holders differ in their 
preference for risk because of their differential payoff function. While debt holders are mostly 
concerned with the firm’s ability to pay back interest and principal and thus prefer safer 
investments, shareholders usually are not concerned with diversifiable risk. As pointed out by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), shareholders essentially hold a call option with the exercise price 
being the face value of the debt. Thus, from shareholders’ perspective, one potential cost of the 
increase in the use of debt financing is foregoing risky projects with positive NPV. To shed light 
on this issue, we follow prior research (e.g., Guay 1999) and use return volatility, measured as 
the standard deviation of weekly stock returns, to capture a firm’s risk taking behavior. Using a 
similar research design as Cheng and Farber (2008), we find that material restatement firms with 
a large increase in the use of debt financing on average experience a decrease in return volatility 
(a decrease of 0.003), whereas other material restatement firms have an increase in return 
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volatility (an increase of 0.004). The difference in differences is significant at the 0.01 level. This 
decrease in return volatility is potentially due to such firms’ changes in investment behavior.  
5.4 Alternative explanation - SEC restriction on public financing 
 Some readers may wonder whether the reduced use of equity financing after restatements 
is driven by the SEC’s sanctions imposed on restatement firms. Because of ongoing 
investigations and the delay in filing annual reports (Badertscher and Burks 2010), the SEC may 
restrict firms’ access to public capital markets in the years after restatements. To address this 
issue, we read the MD&A section of the material restatement firms’ annual reports for the post-
restatement period. We look for any indication that firms are restricted from accessing public 
financing by regulators. We were only able to find several such cases, and excluding those firms 
from our empirical analyses does not affect the results.  
5.5 Using the propensity score approach to find matching firms 
In this section, we use the propensity score method to find matching firms and then 
replicate the main analyses. Specifically, we run a logistic regression with the dependent variable 
being an indicator variable for restatement firms. We include all firms that do not restate 
financial statements in the sample period as the control firms. The independent variables include 
firm size, market-to-book ratio, stock returns, and leverage. We run this regression by industry-
year with industry defined based on the Fama-French classification. Based on this regression, for 
each restatement firm-year in the post-restatement period, we find a firm in the same industry-
year with the closest propensity score as the matching firm. We then replicate the main analyses. 
For the sake of space, we do not tabulate the results.    
Overall, the results are similar to those in Tables 4 and 5. Firms with material restatements 
experience a significant increase in the use of debt financing and the relative use of private debt. 
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Specifically, when explaining the use of debt financing, the coefficient on Post × Material is 
0.121 (p-value =0.004) and when explaining the use of private debt financing, the coefficient on 
Post × Material is 0.078 (p-value =0.017). These statistics are quantitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 4 and Table 5. Also, as in Tables 4 and 5, other restatement firms do not 
experience a significant change in the use of debt or private debt financing.17  
5.6 Alternative benchmark years 
An alternative explanation for our results is that managers engage in earnings management 
before equity financing to reduce the cost of raising equity capital. After restatements, firms do 
not need equity financing because they already have enough equity funds obtained in the pre-
restatement period. To ensure that our results are not driven by this alternative explanation, we 
exclude from the benchmark years the years right before the restatement announcement year, 
since those years should be the ones that are most likely affected by earnings-management-
induced equity financing, if any. When we exclude year t-1 or years t-2 and t-1 from the 
benchmark years, the inferences remain similar. These results indicate that this alternative story 
does not explain our results.  
5.7 Change in information asymmetry for the restatement firms 
An important assumption underlying our argument is that restatement firms experience a 
decrease in accounting information credibility and an increase in information asymmetry. In this 
section, we test whether restatement firms experience an increase in information asymmetry in 
the years after restatement announcements. Based on prior research, we use two commonly used 
proxies of information asymmetry: (1) the standard deviation of the daily stock return residual 
                                                 
17 We also replicate the analyses in other tables and find that the inferences remain the same. 
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for a firm-year and (2) the average of bid-ask spread for a firm-year.18 In an untabulated analysis, 
we regress the information asymmetry proxies on restatement dummies, indicators for post-
restatement years, the interaction between them, as well as control variables. We find that 
compared to matching firms, firms with material restatements experience significant increases in 
both proxies of information asymmetry in the three years after the restatement announcements. 
In contrast, other restatement firms do not experience a significant change in information 
asymmetry compared to matching firms. These results confirm our assumption that firms with 
material restatements experience a decrease in the credibility of accounting earnings and an 
increase in information asymmetry after restatement announcements.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate whether accounting information quality affects firms’ external 
financing choices. We focus on the restatement setting, since restatements are associated with a 
reduction in investors’ confidence in accounting information quality. By linking this shock to the 
changes in external financing choices, we are able to examine the association of accounting 
information quality and firms’ external financing choices in a powerful research setting.  
Our sample includes 819 restatements in the period 1997-2006, of which 236 are classified 
as material restatements per Hennes et al. (2008). We compare the change in external financing 
choices from the pre- to the post-restatement period between the restatement firms and control 
firms matched by industry, year, size, and performance. We find that after restatements, firms 
                                                 
18 Both measures have sound theoretical support and are widely used in the literature. For example, Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam (1999) and Huson and MacKinnon (2003) argue that the standard deviation of stock return 
residual captures the asymmetry between managers and investors about firm-specific information. Copeland and 
Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), and Chae (2005) argue that market 
makers widen bid-ask spreads when they suspect a high level of information asymmetry and show that high bid-ask 
spreads are associated with high information asymmetry. 
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rely more on debt financing, in particular private debt financing, and less on equity financing. 
We find that the results are driven by firms with material restatements. In addition, our cross-
sectional analyses indicate that material restatement firms with an increase in forecast dispersion, 
a proxy for more severe information problems, are associated with an even greater tendency to 
switch to debt financing after restatement announcements. We also find that material restatement 
firms with prompt CEO/CFO turnover and auditor dismissal experience a smaller change in 
external financing choices, consistent with such firms being able to regain investors’ trust.  
The above findings indicate that accounting information quality significantly affects firms’ 
external financing choices. After restatements, the perceived quality of accounting information 
decreases. As a result, the restatement firms have to rely more on private debt financing, since 
private debt holders are better able to address information problems than equity holders. Overall 
our paper provides new evidence on the impact of accounting information quality on firms’ 
external financing choices as well as on external financing consequences of accounting 
restatements. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Firm Size = Natural log of total assets; 
LEV = Debt to total asset ratio, where debt is the sum of long-term debt and short-
term debt; 
M / B = Market value of assets divided by book value of assets, with market value 
of assets defined as book value of assets minus book value of common 
equity, minus deferred taxes, and plus market value of equity;  
ROA = Return on assets, defined as operating income before depreciation  divided 
by total assets; 
 PPE/TA= Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets; 
Marginal tax rate = Simulated marginal tax rate provided by John Graham. If it is missing, the 
value is replaced by an estimated value based on Graham and Mills (2008); 
Specifically, the estimated value is calculated as 0.331 – 0.075 × 
LowUSETRDummy – 0.012 × NOLDummy – 0.106 × BookLossDummy + 
0.037 × ForeignActivityDummy, where LowUSETRDummy = 1 if federal 
tax is less than 10% of domestic pretax income, zero otherwise; 
NOLDummy = 1 if tax loss carry forward is greater than 0, zero otherwise; 
BookLossDummy =1 if pre-tax income is less than 0, zero otherwise; and 
ForeignActivityDummy = 1 if foreign pre-tax income is greater than 5% of 
total pretax income, zero otherwise. Please see Graham and Mills (2008) 
for more details; 
Stock return = The market-adjusted stock returns in the fiscal year. 
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Appendix B: Logit Regression of the Probability of External Financing 
 
This table reports the Logit regression of the probability of external financing around restatement 
announcements: 
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The sample includes 819 pairs of restatement and matching firms in the pre- and post-restatement period.  
The regression is based on 8,383 firm-years with available data. External_Financingit is one if the firm 
has non-zero external financing in the year and zero otherwise. Postit is the indicator for the post-
restatement period, that is, the three years after the restatement year. The three years before restatement 
announcements are used as benchmark years. Materiali is an indicator for material restatement firms, and 
OtherRestatementi is an indicator for other restatement firms. Control variables are measured at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Please see Appendix A for the measurement of control variables.  
 
The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding two-sided p-values (except for the 
interaction terms, for which one-sided p-values are reported), the number of observations, and pseudo R2. 
The p-value is based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year-level clustering. 
 
  Coef. p-value Marginal effect 
Intercept  -0.624 0.037  
Material  0.193 0.001 0.076 
Other Restatement  -0.043 0.281 -0.017 
Post  0.009 0.867 0.003 
Post × Material  -0.314 0.001 -0.124 
Post × Other Restatement  -0.001 0.491 -0.001 
 
Firm size  0.163 0.001 0.117 
LEV  0.369 0.001 0.033 
M/B  0.001 0.838 0.002 
ROA  -0.095 0.156 -0.015 
PPE/TA  0.176 0.049 0.017 
Marginal tax rate  -0.300 0.005 -0.017 
Stock return  0.100 0.001 0.035 
 
Matched pair dummies  YES   
Industry-fixed effects  YES   
N  8,383   
Pseudo R2  0.067   
 
 
  
36 
 
TABLE 1  
Sample selection and descriptive statistics of restatement firms 
 
This table describes the selection process of our restatement sample, 819 restatement firms with 
restatements announced in the period 1997-2006, and the characteristics of the restatement firms.  
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 
Restriction  
Sample 
size
 
Accounting restatements in the period 1997-2006 (per GAO reports)  
 
2,705
 
Less:  
  
Firms without basic financial data from Compustat (i.e., total assets, sales, 
and net income) 341 
  
Subsequent restatements a 573 
  
Firms operating in regulated or financial industries (i.e., SICs falling between 
4900 and 4999 or between 6000 and 6999) 321 
  
Firms without external financing activities over the six years around the 
restatement announcement year 284 
 
  
Firms without required data from CRSP or Compustat to calculate regression 
variables  189 
 
Firms without matching firms (matched on 3-digit SICs, year, firm size, and 
performance measures) b 178 
  
Restatement firms used in the analyses  819
 
Classification of accounting restatements 
  
Material restatements, i.e., restatements identified as “accounting 
irregularities” per Hennes et al. (2008)  236
 
Other restatement firms used in the analyses  583
 
a We only keep the first observation for firms with multiple restatements in the sample period. 
b We lose 26 restatement firms because we cannot find appropriate matching firms based on the matching 
criteria. We lose another 152 restatement firms because the corresponding matching firms do not have 
required data to calculate regression variables. 
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TABLE 1 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Financial characteristics of the restatement firms in the restatement announcement 
year  
 
 Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Market value ($ millions)  2,237.96 4,092.76 165.78 567.02 2,087.24
Total assets ($ millions)  1,352.80 2,396.79 109.45 381.38 1,400.29
Sales ($ millions)  1,374.32 2,381.02 93.06 383.95 1,411.28
Book value ($ millions)  444.05 781.13 30.82 135.04 474.68
Operating income ($ millions)  140.02 267.21 0.38 33.26 147.25
Leverage   0.253 0.218 0.047 0.223 0.397
ROA   0.057 0.153 0.003 0.092 0.149
Z-score   5.375 5.294 1.711 3.709 9.658
Market-to-book  1.771 1.028 1.075 1.417 2.080
Stock returns  0.046 0.641 -0.394 -0.056 0.304
 
Material restatements 
 
 
 
Market value ($ millions)  3,051.56 6,237.15 203.35 634.81 2,312.72
Total assets ($ millions)  2,145.40 4,473.68 135.88 482.03 1,617.37
Sales ($ millions)  1,927.58 3,587.03 120.88 497.65 1,769.53
Book value ($ millions)  470.87 937.18 26.66 142.42 494.30
Operating income ($ millions)  167.54 409.52 -1.28 29.85 141.26
Leverage   0.286 0.225 0.100 0.267 0.428
ROA   0.011 0.144 -0.002 0.073 0.122
Z-score   4.436 4.710 1.453 2.933 6.414
Market-to-book  1.559 0.853 1.033 1.287 1.690
Stock returns  -0.229 0.477 -0.584 -0.305 0.064
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive statistics on external financing 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics on external financing for the 819 restatement firms in our 
sample. The table reports the number of firms with any type of external financing (private debt, public 
debt, or equity) and the mean amount of funds raised for each of the six years around year t as well as for 
year t. Year t refers to the fiscal year in which the restatement announcement falls.  
 
 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 
Number of firms with external 
financing  426 437 446 376 408 350 294 
        
Average amount of funds raised 
across firms with external financing 
($ millions) 
       
Total  474.88 512.67 509.40 683.68 455.59 590.13 719.62
Debt 396.20 412.40 432.32 600.52 388.70 506.01 654.90
       Private debt 226.79 223.94 263.08 340.41 279.24 346.23 389.29
       Public debt  169.41 188.46 169.24 260.11 109.46 159.78 265.61
Equity 78.68 100.27 77.08 83.16 66.89 84.12 64.72
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TABLE 3  
Change in the relative use of each type of external financing 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics on the relative use of each type of external financing in the pre- and post-restatement periods.  The left-
hand side of the table presents the statistics on the full sample of 819 restatement firms and the matching firms, and the right-hand side of the table 
presents the statistics on the 236 material restatement firms and the corresponding matching firms. For each firm, the proportion of a specific type 
of financing in the pre-restatement period is the ratio of that type of financing in dollar amount in the three years before the restatement 
announcement year over total external financing the firm has in the same period. The proportion of each type of financing in the post-restatement 
period is defined similarly. 
 
 All restatement firms  Material restatement firms 
  
Pre-
restatement 
period 
(a) 
Post-
restatement 
period 
(b) (b) – (a) (p-value)  
Pre-
restatement 
period 
(a) 
Post-
restatement 
period 
(b) (b) – (a) (p-value) 
Mean Equity Financing        
Restatement firms (1) 0.302 0.275 -0.027 (0.119)  0.324 0.191 -0.133 (0.001) 
Matching firms (2) 0.291 0.264 -0.027 (0.123)  0.291 0.264 -0.027 (0.379) 
(1) – (2) 0.011 0.011 -0.001 (0.985)  0.033 -0.073 -0.106 (0.014) 
 
Mean Private debt financing         
Restatement firms (1) 0.542 0.588 0.046 (0.015)  0.510 0.665 0.155 (0.001) 
Matching firms (2) 0.571 0.594 0.023 (0.215)  0.572 0.593 0.021 (0.513) 
(1) – (2) -0.029 -0.006 0.023 (0.392)  -0.062 0.072 0.134 (0.004) 
 
Mean Public debt financing        
Restatement firms (1) 0.155 0.137 -0.018 (0.142)  0.166 0.143 -0.023 (0.320) 
Matching firms (2) 0.137 0.141 0.004 (0.758)  0.137 0.142 0.005 (0.808) 
(1) – (2) 0.018 -0.004 -0.022 (0.208)  0.029 0.001 -0.028 (0.380) 
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TABLE 4  
Multiple regressions of the change in the use of debt financing 
This table reports the results from the following Tobit regressions: 
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The sample includes 819 pairs of restatement and matching firms in the pre- and post-restatement period. 
The regressions are based on 4,289 firm-years with non-zero external financing and available data. 
Debt_Financingit is the ratio of debt financing (including both public and private debt financing) in dollar 
amount over the total amount of external financing, where the total amount of external financing is the 
sum of equity and debt financing. If a firm does not have debt financing, the variable is set as zero. Postit 
is the indicator for the post-restatement period, that is, the three years after the restatement announcement 
year. The three years before restatement announcements are used as benchmark years. Restatementi is an 
indicator for restatement firms, Materiali is an indicator for material restatement firms, and 
OtherRestatementi is an indicator for other restatement firms. Control variables are measured at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Please see Appendix A for the measurement of control variables. Inverse 
Mills Ratio is generated from the 1st stage regression, which is estimated using all firm-years from the 
sample (with or without external financing), with the incidence of external financing as the dependent 
variable and the same explanatory variables as the reported 2nd stage regression.  
The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding two-sided p-values (except for the 
interaction terms, for which one-sided p-values are reported), the number of observations, and pseudo R2. 
The p-value is based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering. 
  
Restatement firms 
(1)  
Separating material restatements 
from other restatement firms 
(2) 
  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value
Intercept  -0.252 0.085  -0.248 0.061
Restatement  -0.027 0.001   
Material   0.001 0.994
Other Restatement   -0.039 0.001
Post  -0.070 0.001  -0.068 0.001
Post × Restatement  0.037 0.021   
Post × Material   0.111 0.001
Post × Other Restatement   0.008 0.357
Firm size  0.084 0.001  0.084 0.001
LEV  0.072 0.287  0.062 0.348
M/B  -0.035 0.001  -0.034 0.001
ROA  0.477 0.001  0.486 0.001
PPE/TA  0.122 0.005  0.133 0.001
Marginal tax rate  0.111 0.183  0.116 0.171
Stock return  -0.006 0.560  -0.007 0.545
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.355 0.001  0.344 0.001
Matched pair dummies  YES  YES 
Industry-fixed effects  YES  YES 
N  4,289  4,289 
Pseudo R2  0.404  0.406 
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TABLE 5  
Multiple regressions of the change in the use of private (vs. public) debt financing 
This table reports the results from the following Tobit regressions: 
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The sample includes 819 pairs of restatement and matching firms in the pre- and post-restatement period. 
The regressions are based on 3,065 firm-years with non-zero debt financing and available data. 
Private_Debtit is the ratio of private debt financing in dollar amount over the total amount of debt 
financing (including both public and private debt financing). If a firm does not have private debt 
financing, the variable is set as zero. Postit is the indicator for the post-restatement period, that is, the 
three years after the restatement announcement year. The three years before restatement announcements 
are used as benchmark years. Restatementi is an indicator for restatement firms, Materiali is an indicator 
for material restatement firms, and OtherRestatementi is an indicator for other restatement firms. Control 
variables are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Please see Appendix A for the measurement of 
control variables. Inverse Mills Ratio is generated from the 1st stage regression, which is estimated using 
all firm-years from the sample, with the incidence of debt financing as the dependent variable and the 
same explanatory variables as the reported 2nd stage regression.  
The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding two-sided p-values (except for the 
interaction terms, for which one-sided p-values are reported), the number of observations, and pseudo R2. 
The p-value is based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering. 
  
Restatement firms 
(1)  
Separating material restatements 
from other restatement firms 
(2) 
  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value
Intercept  0.471 0.053  0.494 0.016
Restatement  -0.035 0.057   
Material   -0.085 0.005
Other Restatement   -0.009 0.680
Post  0.034 0.138  0.039 0.073
Post × Restatement  0.048 0.049   
Post × Material   0.086 0.022
Post × Other Restatement   0.036 0.133
Firm size  -0.060 0.006  -0.061 0.001
LEV  -0.051 0.335  -0.057 0.211
M/B  -0.022 0.004  -0.021 0.005
ROA  0.242 0.008  0.242 0.009
PPE/TA  -0.147 0.012  -0.159 0.005
Marginal tax rate  0.159 0.019  0.157 0.020
Stock return  -0.010 0.329  -0.012 0.200
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.022 0.812  -0.083 0.439
 
Matched pair dummies  YES  YES 
Industry-fixed effects  YES  YES 
N  3,065  3,065 
Pseudo R2  0.308  0.309 
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TABLE 6  
The change in the use of debt financing: the information effect  
This table reports the results from the following Tobit regression: 
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The sample includes 236 pairs of material restatement and matching firms in the pre- and post-
restatement period. The regressions are based on 678 firm-years with non-zero external financing and 
analyst forecast data. Debt_Financingit is the relative use of debt financing by firm i in year t. It is defined 
as the ratio of debt financing in dollar amount to the total amount of external financing, where the total 
amount of external financing is the sum of equity financing and debt financing (including both public and 
private debt financing). If a firm does not have debt financing, the variable is set as zero. Postit is the 
indicator for the post-restatement period, that is, the three years after the restatement announcement year. 
The three years before restatement announcements are used as benchmark years. Materiali is an indicator 
for material restatement firms; Dispersion_upi is the standardized decile rank of the change in forecast 
dispersion around restatement announcements; the larger the increase in forecasts dispersion, the higher 
the value of Dispersion_upi; Forecast_downi is the standardized inverse decile rank of the change in 
earnings forecasts around restatement announcements; the more negative forecast revision is, the higher 
the value of Forecast_downi. Control variables are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Please 
see Appendix A for the measurement of control variables. Inverse Mills Ratio is generated from the 1st 
stage regression, which is estimated using all firm-years from the sample (with or without external 
financing), with the incidence of external financing as the dependent variable and the same explanatory 
variables as the reported 2nd stage regression. 
The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding two-sided p-values (except for the 
interaction terms in bold, for which one-sided p-values are reported), the number of observations, and 
pseudo R2. The p-value is based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering. 
 Coef. p-value 
Intercept -1.526 0.001 
Material -0.048 0.001 
Material×Dispersion_up -0.005 0.621 
Material×Forecast_down 0.032 0.003 
Post -0.029 0.001 
Post × Material 0.043 0.001 
Post × Material×Dispersion_up 0.050 0.003 
Post ×Material×Forecast_down  -0.116 0.002 
Firm size 0.080 0.001 
LEV 0.044 0.003 
M/B -0.021 0.001 
ROA 0.455 0.001 
PPE/TA 0.536 0.001 
Marginal tax rate 0.016 0.488 
Stock return 0.018 0.001 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.544 0.001 
Matched pair dummies YES  
Industry-fixed effects  YES  
N 678  
Pseudo R2 0.457  
43 
 
TABLE 7 
The change in the use of debt financing in individual years 
This table reports the results from the following Tobit regression: 
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The sample includes 236 pairs of material restatement and matching firms in the pre- and post-
restatement period. The regressions are based on 1,539 firm-years with non-zero external financing and 
available data. Debt_Financingit is the relative use of debt financing by firm i in year t. It is defined as the 
ratio of debt financing in dollar amount to the total amount of external financing, which is the sum of 
equity financing and debt financing. If a firm does not have debt financing, the variable is set as zero. 0itI , 
1
itI , 
2
itI , and 
3
itI  are the indicators for the year of restatement announcement, the first year after, second 
year after, and third year after, respectively. The three years before restatement announcements are used 
as benchmark years. Materiali is an indicator for material restatement firms. Control variables are 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Please see Appendix A for the measurement of control 
variables. Inverse Mills Ratio is generated from the 1st stage regression, which is estimated using all firm-
years from the sample (with or without external financing), with the incidence of external financing as the 
dependent variable and the same explanatory variables as the reported 2nd stage regression. 
The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding two-sided p-values (except for the 
interaction terms, for which one-sided p-values are reported), the number of observations, and pseudo R2. 
The p-value is based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering. 
  Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.305 0.380 
Material  -0.031 0.223 
 
Indicator for year t  -0.119 0.051 
Indicator for year t+1  -0.062 0.136 
Indicator for year t+2  -0.046 0.062 
Indicator for year t+3  -0.011 0.749 
 
Indicator for year t     × Material  0.175 0.014 
Indicator for year t+1 × Material  0.191 0.004 
Indicator for year t+2 × Material  0.136 0.001 
Indicator for year t+3 × Material  0.106 0.066 
 
Firm size  0.043 0.226 
LEV  -0.066 0.426 
M/B  -0.034 0.003 
ROA  0.679 0.001 
PPE/TA  0.084 0.179 
Marginal tax rate  0.145 0.204 
Stock returns  -0.025 0.392 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.114 0.068 
Match pair dummies  YES  
Industry-fixed effects  YES  
N  1,539  
Pseudo R2  0.413  
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TABLE 8  
The impact of CEO/CFO turnover and auditor turnover on the change in debt financing 
This table reports the results from the following Tobit regression: 
it1ti,
iiitiiit
iiitiiii
iiiititiit
εDummiesIndustryλDummiesPairMatchedγControls
DismissalAuditorMaterialPostTurnoverCFOCEOMaterialPost
eLMaterialPostDismissalAuditorMaterialTurnonverCFOCEOMaterial
eLMaterialMaterialPostPostMaterialFinancingDebt

uuuu
uuuu
uu 




M
EE
EEE
EEEED
5352
514342
41321
/
arg/
arg
(5)
 
The sample includes 236 pairs of material restatement and matching firms. The regressions are based on 
1,288 firm-years with non-zero external financing and available turnover data. Debt_Financingit is the 
relative use of debt financing by firm i in year t. It is defined as the ratio of debt financing in dollar 
amount to the total amount of external financing. It is set as zero if a firm does not have debt financing. 
Postit is the indicator for the post-restatement period, i.e., the three years after the restatement year. The 
three years before the restatement year are used as benchmark years. Materiali is an indicator for material 
restatement firms. Large is the standardized decile rank of restatement magnitude (scaled by total assets at 
the end of year t-1) (the more negative the restatement is, the higher the value of Large is), 
CEO/CFO_Turnover is an indicator variable for material restatement firms that experienced a change in 
both CEO and CFO in year t or t+1 (compared to year t-1), and Auditor_Dismissal is an indicator variable 
for material restatement firms that experienced auditor dismissals in year t or t+1 (compared to year t-1). 
Control variables are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Please see Appendix A for the 
measurement of control variables. Inverse Mills Ratio is generated from the 1st stage regression, which is 
estimated using all firm-years from the sample (with or without external financing), with the incidence of 
external financing as the dependent variable and the same explanatory variables as the reported 2nd stage 
regression.The table reports the coefficient estimates and the two-sided p-values (except for the 
interaction terms in bold, for which one-sided p-values are reported), the number of observations, and 
pseudo R2. P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year-level clustering. 
  Coef. p-value 
Intercept  -0.503 0.277 
Material  -0.016 0.778 
Material × Large  0.054 0.606 
Material × CEO/CFO turnover  -0.086 0.223 
Material × Auditor turnover  0.011 0.819 
Post  -0.079 0.006 
Post × Material   -0.031 0.718 
Post × Material × Large  0.287 0.027 
Post × Material × CEO/CFO_Turnover  -0.129 0.056 
Post × Material × Auditor_Dismissal  -0.119 0.032 
Firm size  0.077 0.040 
LEV  0.018 0.816 
M/B  -0.034 0.001 
ROA  0.603 0.001 
PPE/TA  0.080 0.311 
Marginal tax rate  0.164 0.190 
Stock return  0.003 0.893 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.454 0.001 
Matched pair dummies   YES  
Industry-fixed effects  YES  
N  1,288  
Pseudo R2  0.429  
 
